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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                     
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 This appeal arises from a suit alleging, among other 
things, violations of § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act 
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), in connection with plaintiffs' 
investment in forward contracts through defendant First Western 
Government Securities ("First Western").  Defendant Arvey, Hodes, 
Costello & Burman ("Arvey"), a Chicago law firm, issued three 
opinion letters concerning the tax consequences of these 
investments.  Plaintiffs Ernest P. Kline and Eugene F. Knopf 
allege that Arvey's opinion letters contained both affirmative 
misrepresentations and material omissions in their treatment of 
these transactions.  They further contend that they relied upon 
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these opinion letters in deciding to invest with First Western 
and that as a result they incurred substantial financial losses. 
The district court denied Arvey's motion for summary judgment on 
the misrepresentation claim but granted it on the omissions 
claim.  We conclude that both the misrepresentation and omissions 
claims should be tried.  We will therefore affirm in part and 
reverse in part, and we will remand the case to the district 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I. 
 It is important to emphasize at the outset that, 
because we are reviewing the partial grant of a motion for 
summary judgment, we must view the facts in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party.  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. 
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).  Thus, "[t]he 
evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable 
inferences are to be drawn in his favor."  Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 
 The central figure in this case is defendant Sidney 
Samuels, who founded First Western in 1978.  Prior to that time 
Samuels was a general partner in Price & Company ("Price"). 
According to plaintiffs, First Western's trading program was 
substantially similar to Price's and indeed was modeled on it. 
Significantly, Arvey represented both Price and First Western. 
Arvey assisted Samuels and his partner, Larry Price, in the 
formation of Price, drafted Price's limited partnership agreement 
and its 1977 offering memorandum, and represented it in 
connection with IRS civil and criminal investigations.  Arvey 
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began assisting Samuels in setting up First Western while he was 
still a general partner in Price.  The firm became First 
Western's general counsel and assisted in the drafting of forms 
to be used by First Western, including the brochure describing 
the program.  There is some suggestion in the record that Arvey 
helped design the straddle transactions used by First Western. 
(Joint Appendix ("JA") at 154.)  At First Western's request, 
Arvey also provided it with three opinion letters addressing the 
federal income tax treatment of these transactions.  These 
opinion letters were dated September 20, 1978, June 8, 1979, and 
November 12, 1980. 
 The transactions engaged in by First Western involved 
forward contracts to purchase and sell money market instruments, 
specifically Government National Mortgage Association securities 
("GNMA's") and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
participation certificates ("FMAC's").  A "forward contract" is a 
contract to purchase or sell a specified security, at a 
designated interest rate, on a fixed future date.  In a straddle 
transaction an investor enters into a pair of forward contracts, 
agreeing both to buy and sell securities in the future.  The 
difference between the "buy" contract and the "sell" contract 
results in a "spread" position, resulting in gain or loss to the 
investor depending on whether interest rates rise or fall. 
Accordingly, before entering into a straddle an investor must 
decide how to "bias" the spread by predicting whether interest 
rates will rise or fall. 
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 First Western's agreements with its customers provided 
that a customer could arrange for the cancellation of his 
obligations under a forward contract prior to the settlement 
date.  First Western would then "charge or credit the customer's 
account with an amount equal to the profit First Western or the 
customer, respectively, would be entitled to receive in the event 
delivery was effectuated pursuant to such contract as of the date 
of cancellation."  (Arvey Opinion Letters, 9/20/78, JA at 138; 
6/8/79, JA at 562.)  Typically investors would choose to cancel 
the losing side of their straddle.  The tax treatment of the 
resulting loss was the subject of the Arvey opinion letters. 
 In the opinion letters Arvey concluded that, if First 
Western and a customer agreed "to cancel a forward contract prior 
to its settlement date, the consequent gain or loss realized by 
the customer should constitute ordinary gain or loss to be 
recognized by the customer in the year in which the contract is 
canceled."  (Arvey Opinion Letter, 6/8/79, JA at 563.)0  The 
three letters also contained language advising First Western that 
the Internal Revenue Service and the courts might arrive at a 
contrary conclusion.   
 As the following excerpts show, each of the letters 
also provided that the opinions were based on facts as provided 
by First Western and were for the use of First Western only: 
September 20, 1978, letter: 
                                                           
0The September 20, 1978, and the November 12, 1980, letters 
contain essentially the same language.  (JA at 139-40, 578.) 
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The following paragraphs contain a summary of 
such transactions as you [First Western] have 
described them to us.  (JA at 135.) 
 
[T]his opinion is subject to the consummation 
of the transactions between First Western and 
its customers under the facts and conditions 
described above and is further expressly 
conditioned on your representation that the 
transactions entered into by First Western 
and its customers will be for the purpose, 
and with a reasonable expectation, of 
economic gain.  (JA at 140.) 
 
 This letter is intended for your 
personal use only and is not intended to be, 
and should not be, relied upon by persons 
other than First Western.  (JA at 149.) 
 
 June 8, 1979, letter: 
 
You have advised us that the facts set forth 
below constitute an accurate and complete 
presentation of all relevant information with 
regard to such transactions.  (JA at 558.) 
 
[T]his opinion is subject to the consummation 
of the transactions between First Western and 
its customers pursuant to the facts and 
conditions described above and is further 
expressly conditioned on your representation 
that such transactions will be consummated by 
the customers of First Western with a 
reasonable expectation of economic gain.  (JA 
at 563.) 
 
 This letter is intended for your 
personal use only and is not intended to be, 
and should not be, relied upon by persons 
other than First Western.  (JA at 574.) 
 
 November 12, 1980, letter: 
 
 You have advised us that the facts set 
forth below constitute an accurate and 
complete presentation of all relevant 
information with regard to the transactions 
between First Western and its customers, and 
that no material fact necessary to make the 
7 
information herein not false or misleading 
has been omitted.  (JA at 576.) 
 
[T]he conclusions set forth herein are based 
upon the facts and conditions described in 
this letter as you have represented them to 
us and we express no opinion as to the tax 
treatment of any transaction to the extent 
the facts may differ from those contained 
herein. 
 We express no opinion concerning any 
federal income tax consequence other than as 
specifically set forth in this letter, and no 
opinion is expressed with respect to state 
and local taxes, federal or state securities 
laws, or any other federal or state law not 
explicitly referenced herein.  We also 
express no opinion as to the advisability of 
undertaking any transaction described in this 
letter, in that any such determination must 
take into account the individual facts and 
circumstances affecting the particular 
taxpayer. 
 This letter is intended solely for the 
internal use of First Western and, 
accordingly, it is not intended to be, and 
should not be, relied upon by any person 
other than First Western.  Further, this 
letter is not to be quoted or otherwise 
referred to in any documents, including 
financial statements of First Western, nor is 
it to be filed with or furnished to any 
government agency or other person without the 
express prior written consent of this firm. 
Such consent has not been given, and will not 
be given, unless the person to whom this 
letter is to be furnished has previously 
agreed, in writing, that he will not rely 
upon the opinions and conclusions expressed 
herein, but will make his own independent 
evaluation of the federal income tax 
consequences of any transactions to be 
entered into with First Western.  (JA at 
591.) 
 A couple of themes emerge from these excerpts.  First, 
Arvey stressed that its view of the transactions' validity hinged 
on whether they were entered into with a reasonable expectation 
8 
of generating a profit.  Second, the letters asserted that 
Arvey's conclusions might be changed by facts and circumstances 
unique to individual customers' accounts.  Arvey also made these 
points in response to inquiries from potential First Western 
customers about its opinion letters.  (JA at 365-77.) 
 Despite the letters' statement that they were for the 
exclusive use of First Western, Arvey was aware at least as early 
as May 31, 1979, that its opinion letters had reached potential 
investors.  (JA at 365.)  The record before us reflects some ten 
instances in which potential First Western investors contacted 
Arvey regarding its opinion.  (JA at 365-78.)  As the following 
excerpt from an October 21, 1980, letter to Arvey from an 
attorney representing a potential investor makes clear, Arvey was 
put on notice that its efforts to dissuade reliance were not 
always successful: 
 Surely you realize that First Western 
Government Securities is using your letter in 
an effort to obtain investors and is 
furnishing copies of your letter with 
brochures indicating the mechanical operation 
of the program.  As a result, notwithstanding 
statements made in your October 16, 1980, 
letter, please be advised that my client is 
awaiting my receipt of your opinion letter 
before making a decision as to his investment 
with First Western Government Securities. (JA 
at 376.) 
 Plaintiffs Kline and Knopf invested in forward 
contracts with First Western in December 1980, after reading and 
relying upon Arvey's June 1979 and November 1980 opinion letters. 
They incurred losses on their investments, deducted these losses 
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in their income tax filings, and had their deductions disallowed 
by the IRS. 
 Kline and Knopf allege that Arvey knew or recklessly 
disregarded the truth about First Western's trading program.  As 
a result, they contend, Arvey in its opinion letters made 
material misrepresentations and omitted material facts concerning 
the actual structure of First Western transactions.  Plaintiffs 
allege a number of misrepresentations.  They allege that the 
opinion letters stated that under the First Western trading 
program investors would be required to make or accept delivery of 
the underlying securities when in fact no such requirement 
existed.  They allege that the opinion letters represented that 
the prices of First Western's contracts moved independently, and 
thus subject to market risk, when in fact First Western's 
computer trading program artificially set the prices to eliminate 
any risk of loss.0  They allege misrepresentations as to whether 
                                                           
0Plaintiffs contend that the prices set by First Western's 
computer program bore virtually no relation to actual market 
prices.  They point to a study of the First Western trading 
program undertaken by Professor E. Philip Jones of Harvard 
Business School.  Following a thorough analysis of First 
Western's operations, including a review of the assumptions used 
in the computer pricing program, Professor Jones concluded as 
follows: 
First Western's portfolios were a sham. There 
was no independent movement of prices of 
different contracts.  Most of the risk on one 
side of a portfolio was exactly cancelled by 
the risk on the other side of the portfolios. 
... This cancellation of risk was 
accomplished by ignoring market prices for 
GNMAs and FHLMCs, in favor of artificial 
pricing calculations that resulted in prices 
which were substantially different from 
market prices. 
10 
customers would be required to make additional margin deposits 
and as to how First Western calculated the fees it charged for 
cancellation of contracts.  Finally, they allege that the opinion 
letters misrepresented the fact that First Western's transactions 
were designed to obtain tax losses and as structured could not 
support a reasonable expectation of economic gain. 
 As for material omissions, plaintiffs allege that Arvey 
made no reference to prior IRS investigations of Price & Company 
or Sidney Samuels' connection to that firm.0  Furthermore, a 
number of investigations into First Western's trading program had 
commenced by the time Arvey issued its final opinion letter.  The 
IRS had audited a number of First Western investors, the SEC had 
started an investigation and requested numerous documents from 
First Western, and the Minnesota Department of Commerce was 
investigating First Western.  The only reference to these 
activities in the November 12, 1980, opinion letter was as 
follows: "Further, you have informed us that customers of First 
Western are being audited by the Service and that the Service has 
questioned the deductibility of losses realized by customers on 
the basis of the theory set forth by the Service in Rev. Rul. 77-
185."  (JA at 588.)  The letter made no mention of the SEC or 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(JA at 527.) 
0As noted above, plaintiffs allege that First Western's trading 
program was modeled after Price's.  Thus, plaintiffs allege that 
Arvey should have disclosed the fact that, before Arvey issued 
its 1979 opinion letter, the IRS had undertaken a criminal 
investigation into Price's operations.  The IRS investigations 
ultimately led to a finding that Price's trades were sham 
transactions.  Price v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 860 (1987). 
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State of Minnesota investigations, or the IRS investigation into 
Price. 
 Arvey moved for summary judgment on the omissions 
claim, the misrepresentation claim, and tort and RICO claims not 
before us on this appeal.  The district court denied summary 
judgment on all counts except those asserting liability for 
omissions of material fact.  Because the district court believed 
that this case presents two "'controlling issues of law as to 
which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion,'" 
Kline v. First Western Gov't Secs., 794 F.Supp. 542, 557 (E.D.Pa. 
1992) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)), it certified for immediate 
appeal the following two issues: first, whether an attorney may 
be held liable for alleged misrepresentations of fact in an 
opinion letter when those alleged factual statements have been 
specifically attributed to another individual; and, second, 
whether attorneys may be held liable for omissions of fact in an 
opinion letter absent a duty to disclose.0  The district court 
also ruled that Arvey did not meet its burden of proving that 
                                                           
0Plaintiffs sued defendant Arvey under § 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) and Rule 10(b)(5), 17 
C.F.R. 240.10b-5, both as an aider and abettor in Count I of the 
complaint and a primary violator in Counts IV and VI.  We note 
that in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, the Supreme Court 
ruled that "a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and 
abetting suit under §10(b)."  62 U.S.L.W. 4237 (U.S. April 19, 
1994).  This ruling would appear to bar plaintiffs' claims 
against Arvey in Count I, a point which we do not now decide.  
However, we do not believe it affects our analysis with respect 
to whether Arvey may be held liable for material 
misrepresentations or omissions as a primary violator under 
Counts IV and VI. 
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plaintiffs' reliance was unreasonable, id. at 552-54, but did not 
certify that issue for appeal. 
II. 
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  This court has 
jurisdiction over this certified interlocutory appeal pursuant to 
28 U.S.C § 1292(b).  This court granted both parties' petitions 
to appeal on June 8, 1992. 
 Our review of a district court's grant of summary 
judgment is plenary.  Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of 
Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1093 (3d Cir. 1988).  "On review the 
appellate court is required to apply the same test the district 
court should have utilized initially."  Goodman v. Mead Johnson & 
Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
1038 (1977). 
 A court may grant summary judgment only when the 
submissions in the record "show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  "The 
inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether 
there is the need of a trial--whether, in other words, there are 
any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by 
a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor 
of either party."  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250. 
Stated differently, "a motion for summary judgment must be 
granted unless the party opposing the motion can produce evidence 
which, when considered in light of that party's burden of proof 
13 
at trial, could be the basis for a jury finding in that party's 
favor."  J.E. Mamiye & Sons, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 813 F.2d 610, 
618 (3d Cir. 1987)(Becker, J., concurring).  Thus, the party 
opposing summary judgment "must do more than simply show that 
there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts." 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 
586 (1986). 
III. 
 The district court in its resolution of Arvey's motion 
for summary judgment relied on the distinction between liability 
imposed under Rule 10b-5 for misrepresentations and that imposed 
for omissions.  While this distinction is significant in some 
circumstances,0 we do not find it helpful to resolving the 
particular issues presented in this case.  We conclude instead 
that attorneys may be liable for both misrepresentations and 
omissions where the result of either is to render an opinion 
letter materially inaccurate or incomplete. 
 A.  The Misrepresentations Claim 
 Arvey argues that the district court erred in denying 
summary judgment in its favor on plaintiffs' claims that Arvey is 
liable under the federal securities laws for affirmatively 
misrepresenting material facts concerning First Western's trading 
program.  Arvey contends that it was entitled to summary judgment 
on this claim for the simple reason that its opinion letters did 
                                                           
0For example, the Supreme Court has held that in cases "involving 
primarily a failure to disclose," i.e., omissions, reliance may 
be presumed.  Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 
406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972). 
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not contain any misrepresentations.  That is, it asserts that as 
a matter of law it cannot be held liable for an opinion letter in 
which it made explicit that it was basing its opinion on an 
assumed set of facts represented to it by its client and that it 
had conducted no independent investigation into whether those 
represented facts accurately reflected reality.  We are 
unpersuaded by this argument. 
 This court has generally recognized securities fraud 
claims based on allegations of misrepresentations in opinion 
letters.  We have held that "[a]n opinion or projection, like any 
other representation, will be deemed untrue for purposes of the 
federal securities laws if it is issued without reasonable 
genuine belief or if it has no basis."  Herskowitz v. 
Nutri/System, Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied sub nom. Nutri/System, Inc. v. Herskowitz, 489 U.S. 1054 
(1989).  Interpreting the Supreme Court's "scienter" or intent 
requirement as articulated in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 
U.S. 185 (1976), we have explained that 
an opinion must not be made 'with reckless 
disregard for its truth or falsity,' or with 
a lack of 'genuine belief that the 
information disclosed was accurate and 
complete in all material respects.' 
Therefore, an opinion that has been issued 
without a genuine belief or reasonable basis 
is an 'untrue' statement which, if made 
knowingly or recklessly, is culpable conduct 
actionable under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 
Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 776 (3d Cir. 1985) (citations 
omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Wasserstrom v. Eisenberg, 474 
U.S. 946 (1986). 
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 Eisenberg concerned litigation over a tax shelter 
involving the sale of coal rights.  The defendant law firm had 
prepared a tax opinion letter, which was included in the offering 
memoranda, in which it opined that the IRS would allow certain 
deductions.  Plaintiffs alleged that the law firm knew that there 
was no reasonable basis for its opinion.  We held that the law 
firm and an accounting firm that issued an opinion letter 
verifying profit projections included in the offering memoranda 
"are liable if they recklessly expressed opinions which they had 
good reason to believe were baseless."  Id. at 778.  We explained 
that such liability is proper because of the greater information 
possessed by professionals who express opinions upon which third 
parties would rely. 
When a representation is made by 
professionals or 'those with greater access 
to information or having a special 
relationship to investors making use of the 
information,' there is an obligation to 
disclose data indicating that the opinion or 
forecast may be doubtful.  When the opinion 
or forecast is based on underlying materials 
which on their face or under the 
circumstances suggest that they cannot be 
relied on without further inquiry, then the 
failure to investigate further may 'support 
an inference that when the defendant 
expressed the opinion it had no genuine 
belief that it had the information on which 
it could predicate that opinion.' 
Id. at 776 (citations omitted). 
 Herskowitz presented this court with a similar 
situation.  In that case, we held that a securities fraud claim 
against a bank that had issued an opinion letter concerning the 
fairness of the transaction should be submitted to a jury when 
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the claim alleged that the bank knew that the assumptions on 
which it based its opinion were unfounded.  Herskowitz, 857 F.2d 
at 184-85.  See also Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 
184 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982) 
(recognizing securities fraud claim against accounting firm based 
on materially false representations contained in opinion letter). 
 These cases leave no doubt concerning the existence of 
a cause of action for knowing or reckless misrepresentations in 
opinion letters.  The question we must address, then, is whether 
Arvey's disclaimers, to the effect that the opinion was based 
only on facts provided to it by Samuels, should lead us to 
conclude otherwise than that this case should go to trial.  The 
district court relied on Gilmore v. Berg, 761 F.Supp. 358 (D.N.J. 
1991), in concluding that the disclaimers should not have that 
effect.  We agree with that analysis. 
 Gilmore involved a claim against an attorney who, in a 
tax opinion letter, represented that the purchase price of the 
real property involved in the tax shelter at issue was fair "as 
determined by the general partner."  Id. at 370.  Plaintiffs 
contended that the attorney knew that the property had been 
purchased out of bankruptcy for less than one-half the stated 
price.  The court stated: 
The court agrees with plaintiffs that a jury 
could find [the attorney's] statement that 
"the purchase price of $5.3 million reflects 
the fair market value of the property as 
determined by the general partner" is so 
grossly misleading as to constitute 
actionable fraud in failing to disclose 
important facts underlying the determination 
of fair market value.  [The attorney] seeks 
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to exculpate his misleading statement by 
pointing to the qualifying language, "as 
determined by the general partner.'  However, 
plaintiffs have presented evidence that ... 
[he] knew that the fair market value of $5.3 
million was insupportable. 
Id. 
 The analysis in Gilmore, we believe, follows directly 
from Eisenberg and this court's other cases concerning liability 
for opinion letters.  We held in Eisenberg that professionals and 
others with similar access to information must disclose data that 
calls into question the accuracy of an opinion.  766 F.2d at 776. 
This responsibility cannot be evaded by the inclusion of a 
statement that the opinion is based on facts provided by someone 
else.  Thus, when a law firm knows or has good reason to know 
that the factual description of a transaction provided by another 
is materially different from the actual transaction, it cannot 
escape liability simply by including in an opinion letter a 
statement that its opinion is based on provided facts. 
 Plaintiffs here have alleged that Arvey had a long and 
close relationship with Samuels, which extended to assisting him 
in setting up First Western, designing the transactions in which 
First Western engaged, and acting as First Western's general 
counsel.  Plaintiffs also point to Arvey's representation of 
Price, the firm on which First Western allegedly was modeled, in 
IRS audit proceedings.  These allegations clearly permit the 
inference that Arvey knew or had good reason to know that the 
factual assertions contained in its opinion letters did not 
reflect the substance of actual First Western transactions.  As 
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such, Arvey's opinions, despite their disclaimers, fall squarely 
within the category of opinion letters that we have held to be 
actionable. 
 That said, we feel it necessary to emphasize that there 
is a distinction between the issue we have just addressed--
whether the presence of disclaimers precludes an action for 
misrepresentations--and the question of whether plaintiffs 
reasonably relied on the opinion letters.  As this court has 
noted, a plaintiff bringing suit under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
must prove that the defendant (1) made misstatements or omissions 
of material fact; (2) with scienter; (3) in connection with the 
purchase or sale of securities; (4) upon which plaintiffs relied; 
and (5) that plaintiffs' reliance was the proximate cause of 
their injury.  In re Phillips Petroleum Secs. Litig., 881 F.2d 
1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1989).   
 Thus far we have been concerned with the first of these 
issues--whether Arvey is entitled to summary judgment based on 
its contention that its opinion letters did not contain 
misrepresentations because of the presence of the disclaimers. 
Whether plaintiffs' reliance on Arvey's opinion letters was 
reasonable pursuant to the standard we articulated in Straub v. 
Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 1976), presents a 
separate issue.  The presence and character of disclaimers has 
clear relevance to that determination. 
 The district court concluded that Arvey has not met its 
burden of showing that plaintiffs' reliance on the opinion 
letters was unreasonable, Kline v. First Western Gov't Secs., 794 
19 
F.Supp. at 552-54, and we believe that the record supports its 
conclusion.  Although, as we have noted, the district court did 
not certify the reliance issue for our review, we nevertheless 
feel it necessary to address the issue briefly because under 
§1292(b) "it is the order that is appealable, and not the 
controlling question; and thus we may address any issue necessary 
to decide the appeal before us."   Ivy Club v. Edwards, 943 F.2d 
270, 275 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Del Tufo v. Ivy 
Club, 112 S.Ct. 1282 (1992).  See also United States v. Stanley, 
483 U.S. 669, 677 (1987).  Thus we could reverse the denial of 
summary judgment if, like the dissent, we felt that plaintiffs' 
reliance was unreasonable as a matter of law. 
 In Straub we stated that a variety of factors should be 
considered in determining whether a plaintiffs' reliance was 
reasonable, including: (1) the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship; (2) plaintiffs' opportunity to detect the fraud; 
(3) the sophistication of the plaintiffs; (4) the existence of 
long-standing business or personal relationships; and, (5) access 
to the relevant information.  540 F.2d at 598.  Consideration of 
the evidence before us in light of these factors, we believe, 
leads inexorably to the conclusion that there exists a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether plaintiffs' reliance was 
reasonable so that the denial of summary judgment on this ground 
was proper. 
 We acknowledge that the first and fourth factors weigh 
in favor of Arvey.  The rest, however, favor plaintiffs.  There 
is no evidence suggesting that plaintiffs had access to 
20 
information that would have allowed them to understand that which 
they allege was really taking place.  Arvey, on the other hand, 
had an ongoing attorney-client relationship with First Western 
and Samuels.  Nor is there a suggestion that plaintiffs had an 
opportunity to detect the alleged fraud even without the benefit 
of access to such information.  And while Arvey argues that 
plaintiffs were sophisticated investors, the evidence does not 
compel the conclusion that they were so sophisticated in these 
matters that they should have recognized that the descriptions of 
the transactions in the opinion letters bore little relation to 
reality.0  A potential First Western investor, armed with Arvey 
opinion letters and the information about his own account that 
Arvey stressed might be important, could have obtained a tax 
opinion from his attorney that would have been wrong simply 
because of the misleading way in which the program allegedly was 
described in the opinion letters.0  Mere reliance on the legal 
                                                           
0Unlike the dissent, we do not believe that the fact that "the 
transactions discussed in the opinion letters were meant for 
sophisticated investors," typescript at 15, means that plaintiffs 
were in fact sophisticated enough to unravel First Western's 
scheme.  And while the "cutting edge" nature of these 
transactions perhaps should have put plaintiffs on notice of 
potential tax complications involving the transactions described 
in the opinion letters, id., it has no logical connection to 
whether plaintiffs should have suspected that Arvey knowingly 
misdescribed the transactions. 
0The dissent contends that "there is no way that another attorney 
could have confirmed from the letters themselves that the facts 
underlying the opinions were correct as they were solely within 
the knowledge of First Western."  Typescript at 16-17.  
Plaintiffs' claim, however, is that Arvey also knew or should 
have known that the descriptions of the transactions in the 
opinion letters were inaccurate.  We believe the record contains 
evidence sufficient to support the inference that Arvey had or 
should have had such knowledge, thereby creating a genuine issue 
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conclusions expressed in the opinion letters, without more, would 
have been unreasonable.  But we cannot say as a matter of law 
that it was unreasonable to rely on the description of First 
Western's trading program.  Indeed, such reliance would be 
consistent with the disclaimers insofar as an independent legal 
opinion was sought on the basis of the description of the 
program. 
 In addition to disputing our application of Straub to 
this case, the dissent feels that Arvey is entitled to summary 
judgment based on the "bespeaks caution" doctrine.  Under that 
doctrine 
when an offering document's forecasts, 
opinions or projections are accompanied by 
meaningful cautionary statements, the 
forward-looking statements will not form the 
basis for a securities fraud claim if those 
statements did not affect the 'total mix' of 
information the document provided investors. 
In other words, cautionary language, if 
sufficient, renders the alleged omissions or 
misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of 
law. 
In re Donald J. Trump Secs. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371 (3d Cir. 
1993).  See also Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that "Bespeak 
Caution", 49 Bus. Law. 481 (1994) (summarizing and analyzing 
"bespeaks caution" jurisprudence).  Not just any cautionary 
language will trigger application of the doctrine.  Instead, 
disclaimers must relate directly to that on which investors claim 
to have relied.  As we noted in Trump, "a vague or blanket 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of material fact.  Assuming Arvey possessed such knowledge, its 
recitations of the facts "as provided to it by First Western" 
were made without a genuine belief in their validity and thus 
actionable under the law as expounded in the body of our opinion. 
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(boilerplate) disclaimer which merely warns the reader that the 
investment has risks will ordinarily be inadequate to prevent 
misinformation.  To suffice, the cautionary statements must be 
substantive and tailored to the specific future projections, 
estimates or opinions in the prospectus which the plaintiffs 
challenge."  7 F.3d at 371-72. 
 So conceived, the "bespeaks caution" doctrine clearly 
does not apply to this case except to the extent that plaintiffs 
relied solely and without further investigation or consideration 
on the opinion letters' conclusions as to the tax consequences of 
the First Western transactions.  The cautionary statements in the 
opinion letters provided investors with information that should 
have suggested nothing more to them than the possibility that 
Arvey might have gotten the law wrong or incorrectly assessed the 
risk that the IRS would deny deductions.  The opinion letters did 
not contain statements from which plaintiffs should have inferred 
the risk that Arvey was knowingly or recklessly misstating the 
structure of the entire First Western trading program. 
 In the only other case that we have found concerning a 
similar situation the court reached the same conclusion.  The 
court in Griffin v. McNiff, 744 F.Supp. 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), 
aff'd without op., 996 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1993), provided the 
following account of the case and its resolution: 
Plaintiffs ... challenge more than just the 
future forecasts and predictions in the 
offering materials.  They argue that the 
underlying assumptions of the PPMs, tax 
opinions and projections were designed to 
mislead the investors into believing that the 
partnership investments offered them the 
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opportunity to achieve a profit and a tax 
benefit from their investment, when in 
reality defendants knew that these 
possibilities did not exist ... .  Inasmuch 
as certain of these allegations go to the 
misleading nature of the statements when 
made, the existence of cautionary language 
regarding the general unpredictability of, 
inter alia, oil and gas operations, economic 
trends, and the interpretation of the tax 
laws, will not bar plaintiffs from 
maintaining their claims against the 
remaining defendants. 
Id. at 1253-54 (footnote omitted). 
 In order for there to be a plausible argument for 
application of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine in this case more 
than the simple assertion that the opinion is based on 
represented facts is required.  Trump requires that the language 
bespeaking caution relate directly to that by which plaintiffs 
claim to have been misled.  7 F.3d at 371-72.  Under the law 
regarding omissions, discussed in the next section, Arvey's 
statement that its opinion was based on facts represented to it 
by First Western also contained the implicit assertion that Arvey 
did not know the facts to be otherwise.  It could not therefore 
have alerted plaintiffs to the possibility that Arvey did know 
otherwise.  Thus, for the doctrine to even conceivably preclude 
plaintiffs' claims in this case it would be necessary for the 
letters to have included a disclaimer stating, in essence, that 
there was a possibility that Arvey did know otherwise and that 
the opinion letter was a sham commissioned to construct a facade 
of legitimacy for a trading program that both First Western and 
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Arvey knew was a farce.0  We find no such language and therefore 
conclude that Arvey was not entitled to summary judgment in its 
favor on the basis that plaintiffs' reliance was unreasonable as 
a matter of law. 
 B.  The Omissions Claim 
 The district court granted summary judgment for Arvey 
on all claims to the extent that they alleged liability for 
omissions of material fact.  The court reasoned that attorneys 
cannot be held liable for omissions in an opinion letter unless 
plaintiffs can demonstrate that the attorneys had a duty to 
disclose to them the information that was omitted.  Id. at 550-
51.  Because it concluded that plaintiffs did not show the 
existence of a fiduciary or other relationship which would give 
rise to such a duty, the court held that plaintiffs could not 
proceed with their claims based on Arvey's alleged omissions. 
                                                           
0We note, however, that we do not decide at this time whether 
such a disclaimer would be effective.  One court has noted that 
"it would appear that the doctrine does not apply unless the 
projection at issue reflects an honestly held belief."  Gurfein 
v. Sovereign Group, 826 F.Supp. 890, 908 (E.D.Pa. 1993) (Pollak, 
J.).  Judge Pollak further remarked that if the rule were 
otherwise  
one could construct a completely inaccurate 
and fraudulent offering memorandum, yet be 
shielded from a fraud claim as long as there 
was language in the document cautioning 
investors of the specific risks.  To the 
extent that such a rule would allow, if not 
encourage, fraud and non-disclosure on the 
part of corporate actors, it clearly is not a 
viable application of the "bespeaks caution" 
doctrine. 
Id. at 908 n.20. 
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 We believe the district court's analysis misapprehends 
the issues presented by this case.  We are dealing here with a 
situation in which Arvey, by authoring its opinion letters, has 
elected to speak regarding the transactions at issue.  Plaintiffs 
allege that this speech was misleading because Arvey failed to 
include in its opinion letters information that, if included, 
would have undermined the conclusions reached in those letters. 
In contrast, the cases cited by the district court, as well as 
those cited by Arvey, for the proposition that attorneys may not 
be held liable for omissions absent a duty to disclose concern 
the question of whether a law firm or similar entity has a duty 
to "blow the whistle" on its client.  See Fortson v. Winstead, 
McGuire, Sechrest & Minick, 961 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1992); Abell 
v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied 
sub nom. Abel v. Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, 492 U.S. 918 (1989); 
Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490 (7th 
Cir. 1986).  That is, those cases concerned situations where the 
alleged omissions were unrelated to the validity of the law 
firm's opinion letter or similar communication. 
 Fortson, for example, concerned a suit against a law 
firm that had prepared a tax opinion letter that was included in 
the private placement memorandum used in the offering of 
interests in a real estate limited partnership.  Plaintiffs 
"sought to recover from Winstead on the ground that the firm 
breached its duty under federal securities laws and state common 
law by failing to inquire into and ensure complete and accurate 
disclosure."  Fortson, 961 F.2d at 471.  Plaintiffs did not 
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allege that the tax opinion was inaccurate.  "Instead, they 
challenge[d] the sufficiency of the information provided to them 
as potential investors and contend[ed] that Winstead had a 
responsibility to ensure full and accurate disclosure."  Id. at 
472.  The court refused to impose this obligation on law firms in 
the absence of a fiduciary relationship between the law firm and 
the plaintiffs.  Id. at 472-74.  To do so, the court remarked, 
would be to make attorneys "guarantors of integrity in all 
commercial transactions, whether the context be one of raising 
capital, marketing a product, or negotiating a contract. Lawyers, 
in short, would function in the business world as designated 
watchdogs."  Id. at 475.  See also Barker, 797 F.2d at 496 ("When 
the nature of the offense is a failure to 'blow the whistle', the 
defendant must have a duty to blow the whistle. And this duty 
does not come from § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5; if it did the inquiry 
would be circular.  The duty must come from a fiduciary relation 
outside securities law."). 
 This case, in contrast, presents the question of 
whether, once a law firm has chosen to speak, it may omit facts 
material to its non-confidential opinions.  Here, unlike Fortson, 
the allegedly omitted facts bear directly on the accuracy of the 
tax opinion.  Thus, this situation closely resembles that before 
the Seventh Circuit in Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841 (7th 
Cir. 1991).  In Ackerman investors brought suit against a law 
firm that wrote an opinion letter concluding that the investors 
were entitled to certain deductions for their investments in a 
tax shelter.  The opinion letter recited facts that made the 
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transaction seem legitimate, but were fictitious.  The letter 
cautioned that the firm had "relied on unnamed persons for 
unspecified facts," id. at 843, and added that "'[w]e have not 
made an attempt to independently verify the various 
representations.'"  Id.  The court held that the district court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the law firm was improper. 
Under Rule 10b-5 ... the lack of an 
independent duty does not excuse a material 
lie.  A subject of a tender offer or merger 
bid has no duty to issue a press release, but 
if it chooses to speak it must tell the truth 
about material issues.  Although the lack of 
duty to investors means that Schwartz had no 
obligation to blow the whistle, and none to 
correct a letter he had not authorized to be 
circulated in the first place ... Schwartz 
cannot evade responsibility to the extent he 
permitted the promoters to release his 
letter. 
Id. at 848 (citations omitted). 
 This analysis flows naturally from Eisenberg.  There we 
held that an opinion is actionable if issued "with a lack of a 
genuine belief that the information disclosed was accurate and 
complete in all material respects."  766 F.2d at 776.  Indeed, 
when the foundations of an opinion "suggest that they cannot be 
relied on without further inquiry, then the failure to 
investigate further may 'support an inference that when the 
defendant expressed the opinion it had no genuine belief that it 
had the information on which it could predicate that opinion.'" 
Id. (citations omitted).  Thus, this court has adopted a limited 
duty to investigate and disclose when, by the drafter's omission, 
a public opinion could mislead third parties. 
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 This limited duty not to omit was particularly well-
articulated in Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Util. Auth., 562 
F.Supp. 1180, 1206-08 (W.D.Mo. 1983).  The Rose court, in holding 
that an attorney's failure to disclose material facts in a bond 
opinion letter formed the basis of an actionable securities fraud 
claim, explained that when a professional "undertakes the 
affirmative act of communicating or disseminating information," 
there is 
a general obligation or "duty" to speak 
truthfully; or, alternatively stated, a 
"duty" not to communicate something which is 
known to be untrue (or, perhaps, in which the 
defendant has so little basis for honest 
belief that the requisite degree of 
"recklessness" is involved).  And encompassed 
within that general obligation is also an 
obligation or "duty" to communicate any 
additional or qualifying information, then 
known, the absence of which would render 
misleading that which was communicated. While 
this latter "duty" might loosely be described 
as a "duty to disclose," I would prefer, for 
purposes of distinguishing it from a true 
"duty to disclose," ... to label it as a 
"duty not to omit."  In reality, it is simply 
one facet of the general obligation to speak 
truthfully, arising out of and because of an 
affirmative act by the defendant in 
communicating. 
Id. at 1207 (citations omitted). 
 The record contains evidence sufficient to preclude 
summary judgment on the omissions claim.  Arvey received 
inquiries concerning its opinion letter from potential investors 
prior to issuing its second letter and was explicitly told prior 
to issuing its third letter that First Western was distributing 
copies of its letters along with brochures describing the 
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program.  Plaintiffs have alleged that Arvey failed to disclose 
the SEC and State of Minnesota investigations as well as the IRS 
investigation into the analogous Price trading program.  This 
evidence creates genuine issues of material fact sufficient to 
defeat Arvey's motion for summary judgment. 
 Finally, we must address Arvey's argument that a duty 
not to omit runs against the ethical standards of attorney 
conduct.  This argument is unpersuasive.  Privileges and ethical 
rules cannot be relied on to perpetrate fraud.  See Clark v. 
United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) ("The privilege takes flight 
if the relation is abused.  A client who consults an attorney for 
advice that will save him in the commission of a fraud will have 
no help from the law.  He must let the truth be told."). 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district 
court's decision granting summary judgment for Arvey on 
plaintiffs' claim that Arvey's tax opinion letters contained 
material omissions upon which plaintiffs relied.  We will affirm 
the district court's opinion in all other respects, and will 








Kline v. First Western Government Securities 
Nos. 92-1498, 92-1499  
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 This case raises the issue of when a law firm may be 
liable to third parties for misrepresentations and omissions in 
opinion letters written by the firm to its client.  I am unable 
to join in the majority's opinion because the explicit 
disclaimers in the opinion letters, portions of which the 
majority quotes, made the plaintiffs' reliance on these letters 
unreasonable as a matter of law.  Therefore, I would reverse the 
order of the district court to the extent that it denied the firm 
summary judgment, would affirm the order to the extent that it 
granted the firm summary judgment, and would remand the matter 
for entry of summary judgment in favor of the firm against the 
plaintiffs on the claims involved on this appeal.  My dissent 
addresses only the reasonable reliance issue as described on 
pages 18 through 24 of the typescript of the majority opinion and 
the accompanying footnotes, as in my view that issue is 
dispositive.    
 As germane on this appeal, the plaintiffs alleged that 
the law firm, Arvey, violated section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j), and Rule 10b-5, 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.  The plaintiffs focus their attack on Arvey 
on the factual descriptions of First Western's program contained 
in Arvey's opinion letters.  The plaintiffs contend that these 
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descriptions are inaccurate as a result of both 
misrepresentations and omissions.  They further allege that as a 
consequence of Arvey's misrepresentations and omissions, they 
suffered adverse tax consequences upon the cancellation of losing 
forward contracts because the Internal Revenue Service disallowed 
the deductions they claimed based on these losses.  Indeed, the 
relationship of the plaintiffs' claims to the tax portions of 
Arvey's opinions is demonstrated by the district court's holding 
of this case on its suspense calendar pending the outcome of 
litigation in the Tax Court regarding deductions for losses upon 
the cancellation of losing forward contracts arranged by First 
Western.  The district court activated this case after the 
taxpayers were unsuccessful in that forum.  See Freytag v. 
Comm'r, 89 T.C. 849 (1987), aff'd, 904 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1990), 
aff'd, 111 S.Ct. 2631 (1991).0  The plaintiffs, however, were not 
parties to that Tax Court case.  Instead, they settled their 
cases with the Internal Revenue Service.   
 Arvey responds to the plaintiffs' charges by urging 
that the plaintiffs could not have relied justifiably on the 
opinion letters, as the letters: (1) explicitly addressed assumed 
facts; (2) stated that these facts had been provided by the 
client; and (3) stated that the firm furnished the opinion to 
First Western and it should not be relied upon by persons other 
than First Western.  Thus, Arvey argues that the district court 
                                                           
0The Supreme Court did not deal with the merits of the 
controversy.  The opinion of the Court of Appeals contains a 
succinct description of the First Western program.  904 F.2d at 
1013-14. 
4 
erred in concluding that the qualifying language in the opinion 
letters did not shield it from liability as a matter of law.  I 
agree.   
 I recognize that it is well settled that projections, 
forecasts, and opinions may be actionable under Rule 10b-5 if the 
declarant makes them without a genuine belief in their validity 
or a reasonable basis to believe in their accuracy.  In re Donald 
J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 368, (3d Cir. 1993), 
cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1219 (1994); Herskowitz v. Nutri/System, 
Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 
1054, 109 S.Ct. 1315 (1989); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 
775-76 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946, 106 S.Ct. 342 
(1985).  As we explained in Eisenberg, "[a]n opinion must not be 
made 'with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity' or with a 
lack of a 'genuine belief that the information disclosed was 
accurate and complete in all material respects.'"  766 F.2d at 
776 (citation omitted).  Attorneys and other professionals are 
not exempt from this requirement, and courts have permitted the 
imposition of liability for securities fraud on professionals who 
knowingly or recklessly have issued false or misleading opinions. 
See, e.g., Id.; Duke v. Touche Ross & Co., 765 F. Supp. 69 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); Stevens v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., 694 F. 
Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).   
 To state a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a 
plaintiff must allege that the defendant made (1) a misstatement 
or an omission (2) of material fact (3) with scienter (4) on 
which the plaintiff relied (5) and which proximately caused the 
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plaintiff's injury.  See, e.g., Hayes v. Gross, 982 F.2d 104, 106 
(3d Cir. 1992); Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 280 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 365 (1992); Lewis v. Chrysler 
Corp., 949 F.2d 644, 649 (3d Cir. 1991); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 
540 F.2d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 1976).  Moreover, the plaintiff's 
reliance on the alleged misstatement or omission must be 
reasonable, even though the defendant has the burden of proof to 
show it was not reasonable.  Straub, 540 F.2d at 598. 
Consequently we have stated that to recover under section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5, "the plaintiff [must] act reasonably" and that "a 
sophisticated investor is not barred by reliance upon the honesty 
of those with whom he deals in the absence of knowledge that the 
trust is misplaced."  Id. (emphasis added).  Thus, "an investor 
cannot close his eyes to a known risk" and if he is "cognizant of 
the risk, then there is no liability."  Teamsters Local 282 
Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522, 530 (7th Cir. 1985). 
Accordingly, a securities action defendant may obtain summary 
judgment by demonstrating that the plaintiff's reliance on the 
defendant's statements was unreasonable as a matter of law.   
 It stands to reason that where opinion letters 
regarding a potential investment -- even those prepared with 
scienter -- "bespeak caution," reasonable investors should not 
rely on the representations in them.  See Luce v. Edelstein, 802 
F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1986).  The majority concedes that "[m]ere 
reliance on the legal conclusions expressed in the opinion 
letters, without more, would have been unreasonable," but states 
that it was not unreasonable for plaintiffs to rely on Arvey's 
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descriptions of First Western's trading program although Arvey 
specifically attributed them to First Western and did not purport 
to have verified them.  Typescript at 20-21.  Thus, the majority 
holds that the "bespeaks caution" doctrine applies only "to the 
extent that plaintiffs relied solely and without further 
investigation or consideration on the opinion letters' 
conclusions as to the tax consequences of the First Western 
transactions" because the language in the letters would not have 
alerted plaintiffs that Arvey knew or had reason to know that the 
descriptions were inaccurate.  Id. at 22-24.  The majority's 
suggestion that the plaintiffs could reasonably rely on Arvey's 
opinion letter because "Arvey's statement that its opinion was 
based on facts represented to it by First Western . . . contained 
the implicit assertion that Arvey did not know the facts to be 
otherwise" improperly equates scienter with reasonable reliance. 
Id. at 23.  These requirements are two independent elements which 
must be alleged to state a primary violation of section 10(b) and 
Rule 106-5.   
 Consequently, warnings and disclaimers -- by limiting 
the extent to which an investor can rely on the offering 
documents -- will preclude recovery for securities fraud even 
when the defendant's scienter has been established. "Dismissal of 
securities fraud claims may be appropriate where the offering 
documents specifically warn plaintiffs not to rely on the alleged 
misrepresentations made by defendants, thus making any subsequent 
reliance unjustified."  Griffin v. McNiff, 744 F. Supp. 1237, 
1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 996 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1993) (table). 
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For this reason, several courts have dismissed cases similar to 
this one on the ground that it was unreasonable for the investor 
to have relied on representations in the challenged opinion 
letter in the face of the letter's broad disclaimers or its 
attribution of the facts it recites to a third party.    
 For example in Buford White Lumber Co. v. Octagon 
Properties, Ltd., 740 F. Supp. 1553 (W.D. Okla. 1989), the 
plaintiffs brought a securities fraud suit against the law firm 
that had prepared the offering memorandum for the limited 
partnerships in which they had invested.  The memorandum stated 
that the principals of the limited partnership and not the law 
firm had prepared the historical and financial statements and 
that the firm had not audited these statements.  740 F. Supp. at 
1561.  Accordingly, the court held that   
 
[i]n the face of these disclaimers and 
disclosure of the limited undertaking of 
defendant with respect to information or 
matters disclosed in the offering memorandum, 
it would be unforeseeable as a matter of law 
to a prudent law firm in Defendant's position 
that potential purchasers, including 
Plaintiffs, would rely upon Defendant's 
nondisclosure of any misrepresentations or 
omissions in the financial statements of [the 
limited partnership] as a representation by 
Defendant that the statements were accurate 
by reason of which Plaintiffs might be 
harmed. . . . The Offering memorandum states 
that the financial statements were prepared 
by and were the sole responsibility of [the 
limited partnership]. In short, Defendant did 
not undertake to prepare, evaluate the 
accuracy of, or opine upon the accuracy of 
financial statements by [the limited 
partnership] and said so.  
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740 F. Supp. at 1563.  The court then went on to explain: 
[i]n the face of the statements in the 
Offering Memorandum that the financial 
statements were the sole responsibility of 
[the limited partnership] and were unaudited, 
and disclosures concerning the limited role 
of Defendant in preparing or evaluating 
statements made in the Offering Memorandum, 
the Court agrees with Defendant that any 
reliance by Plaintiffs on Defendant's duty to 
disclose inaccuracies, misrepresentation or 
omissions of [the limited partnership] in 
information it supplied is unreasonable as a 
matter of law.   
 
Id. at 1666.   
 
 Numerous other courts have reached similar decisions. 
See, e.g., Moorhead v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 949 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that bond purchasers 
could not maintain securities fraud action against consultant 
that filed a feasibility study despite alleged 
misrepresentations, where study contained detailed cautionary 
language and specific warnings of risk factors, along with 
underlying factual assumptions); Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d at 
56 ("we are not inclined to impose liability on the basis of 
statements that clearly 'bespeak caution'" where offering 
memorandum warned investors that projections of potential cash 
and tax benefits were "'necessarily speculative'") (citation 
omitted); Friedman v. Arizona World Nurseries Ltd. Partnership, 
730 F. Supp. 521, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (dismissing section 10(b) 
claims on ground that plaintiffs' reliance was unreasonable, 
where accountant's tax opinion stated that the projections 
contained therein were based on representations which were made 
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to the accountants by the promoter of the limited partnership), 
aff'd, 927 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1991) (table); O'Brien v. National 
Property Analysts Partners, 719 F. Supp. 222, 227-29 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989) (holding that no liability attaches where accountant 
specifically attributes its financial assumptions to documents 
given to it by representatives of the limited partnership); 
Stevens v. Equidyne Extractive Indus. 1980, 694 F. Supp. at 1063-
64 (dismissing securities fraud suit against accountant, because 
statements in accountant's opinion letter "set forth that they 
[were] based on supplied facts, [and] additionally state[d] that 
there is no implication that the results predicted can or will be 
achieved"); Feinman v. Shulman Berlin & Davis, 677 F. Supp. 168, 
170-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that where "offering memorandum 
warned plaintiffs not to rely on the misrepresentations which the 
defendants allegedly made [,] plaintiffs' reliance on those 
misrepresentations, if made was unjustified and dismissal is 
appropriate")0; Andreo v. Friedlander, Gaines, Cohen, Rosenthal & 
Rosenberg, 651 F. Supp. 877, 881 (D. Conn. 1986) (dismissing 
section 10(b) claims because the cautionary "language of the 
document in question limited the degree to which investors should 
rely on it" as it told investors that defendant accounting firm 
did not verify the data upon which its projections were based); 
Devaney v. Chester, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 92,747, at 93,649 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 813 F.2d 566, 569 (2d 
                                                           
0In my view, Friedman and Feinman are particularly significant 
because they dealt with caveats concerning the tax consequences 
of the transactions and, as here, warned that the IRS might 
challenge the tax assumptions underlying the investments.   
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Cir. 1987) (dismissing securities fraud claim against investment 
bank because the confidential memorandum it prepared "with its 
broad disclaimers as to the source of information contained 
therein, does not support an allegation of reliance.  Investors 
would not be likely to rely on memoranda which so definitely 
stated their dependency on another source").0       
 Like the law firm in Buford White Lumber Co., Arvey 
made it clear that it did not undertake to guarantee to potential 
investors the accuracy of the factual information contained in 
its letters.  Arvey also made it clear that it was not offering 
advice to such investors.  Each of the opinion letters is 
addressed to Sidney Samuels as president of First Western, and is 
stated to be for the exclusive use of Samuels or First Western. 
The 1980 opinion letter emphasizes this point most strongly.  It 
warns that it "supersedes our letter of June 8, 1979, upon which, 
as you were previously informed, you should no longer rely," App. 
at 576, and contains an even more forceful cautionary statement 
than the earlier letters that: 
 
[t]his letter is intended solely for the 
internal use of First Western and, 
accordingly, it is not intended to be, and 
should not be, relied upon by any person 
other than First Western.  Further, this 
letter is not to be quoted or otherwise 
referred to in any documents, including 
                                                           
0The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the 
district court's judgment on the ground that the court should 
have permitted the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint.  This 
holding, however, did not cast doubt on the district court's 
determination that reliance is unjustified where the document at 
issue contains cautionary language and represents that the source 
of the information contained therein came from a third party. 
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financial statements of First Western, nor is 
it to be filed with or furnished to any 
governmental agency or other person without 
the express prior written consent of this 
firm. 
  
Id. at 590-91.   
 Furthermore, the opinion letters were replete with 
cautionary language.   All three warned that the IRS and the 
courts might "take a strong stance contrary to the opinion 
expressed herein."  Id. at 147 (1978 letter), 574 (1979 letter), 
591 (1980 letter).0  Indeed, the 1980 opinion letter disclosed 
that the IRS was investigating First Western's customers for 
engaging in tax avoidance transactions and that the IRS generally 
viewed the simultaneous holding and selling of forward contracts 
with suspicion.  The letter stated that: 
 
Rev. Rul. 77-185 is part of a concerted 
effort by the Service to curb what it 
considers the abusive use of offsetting 
positions in securities and commodities to 
minimize or defer tax liability.  In addition 
to promulgating Rev. Rul. 77-185, the Service 
has added Chapter 700 ('Commodity Options and 
Futures') to its Tax Shelters Examination 
Handbook, in which it identifies, among other 
transactions, 'the simultaneous buying and 
selling of futures contracts in . . . GNMA 
Certificates' as a 'basic tax shelter 
arrangement.'  The Service has also announced 
a policy of identifying for audit returns 
which contain significant securities and 
commodities transactions, and is presently 
litigating various cases involving 
transactions similar to those involved in 
Rev. Rul. 77-185.  Due to the Service's 
concern with transactions similar to those 
                                                           
0The plaintiffs made their investments in December 1980 after 
they read Arvey's 1979 and 1980 letters.   
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entered into between First Western and its 
customers, persons who enter into 
transactions with First Western may 
substantially increase their chances of being 
audited by the Service.  Further, you have 
informed us that customers of First Western 
are being audited by the Service and that the 
Service has questioned the deductibility of 
losses realized by such customers on the 
basis of the theory set forth by the Service 
in Rev. Rul. 77-185. 
App. at 588 (emphasis added).  This warning, in no uncertain 
terms, put potential investors who read Arvey's letters, 
including the plaintiffs, on notice of the strong possibility 
that the IRS would disallow deductions by investors of any losses 
resulting from the cancellation of First Western contracts on the 
ground that the transactions were really only a tax avoidance 
scheme.  Of course, that is exactly what happened.  Furthermore, 
the 1980 letter disclosed First Western's troubled past by 
discussing the IRS's audits of prior First Western transactions 
identical to those analyzed in the opinion letters.  Thus, the 
plaintiffs cannot state a claim of misrepresentation because the 
facts upon which their claim is premised were disclosed clearly. 
"[T]he naked assertion of concealment of material facts which is 
contradicted by published documents which expressly set forth the 
very facts allegedly concealed is insufficient to constitute 
actionable fraud."  Spiegler v. Wills, 60 F.R.D. 681, 683 
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).0  Furthermore, in the face of this disclosure, 
                                                           
0The cases I have cited do not always distinguish among the 
related concepts that a statement may be so conditioned that: (1) 
it cannot be regarded as misleading; (2) the representations it 
contains may not be material; and (3) reliance on the statement 
may be unreasonable.  Nevertheless all support the conclusion 
that the plaintiffs' reliance in this case was unreasonable. 
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it was unreasonable for the plaintiffs to rely on the Arvey 
letters as support for the validity of deductions for ordinary 
losses upon the cancellation of a losing forward contract. 
   In addition to warning of the possible non-
deductibility of losses resulting from the purchase of First 
Western's forward contracts, the opinion letters clearly 
indicated that they depended on assumed facts.  In this regard, 
the letters prefaced their factual description of First Western's 
trading programs with the following introductory remarks, 
attributing the descriptions to Samuels: "the following 
paragraphs contain a summary of such transactions as you have 
described them to us," App. at 135 (1978 letter); "you have 
advised us that the facts set forth below constitute an accurate 
and complete presentation of all relevant information with regard 
to such transactions,"  Id. at 558 (1979 letter); and "you have 
advised us that the facts set forth below constitute an accurate 
and complete presentation of all relevant information with regard 
to the transactions between First Western and its customers, and 
that no material fact necessary to make the information herein 
not false or misleading has been omitted," Id. at 576 (1980 
letter).   
 Furthermore, almost every specific factual description 
of how the First Western trading program functioned began with 
the phrase "you have represented to us. . ." or the equivalent. 




you have represented to us that the various 
combinations of forward contracts obligating 
the customer to deliver and take delivery of 
money market instruments will, as described 
above, have sufficiently different stated 
interest rates and delivery dates so as to 
produce independent price movement among such 
contracts and cause the customer to have a 
reasonable opportunity of realizing economic 
gain (and a corresponding risk of loss) with 
respect to his various positions.0  
Id. at 560-61, 577 (1979 and 1980 letters).   
 
You have represented to us that the 
transactions entered into by First Western 
and its customers will reflect the customer's 
market strategy and interest rate forecast, 
will have economic validity independent of 
their respective tax consequences, and will 
produce a reasonable opportunity for economic 
gain and risk of economic loss. 
Id. at 573 (emphasis added) (1979 letter).   
 
In addition, this opinion is subject to the 
consummation of the transactions between 
First Western and its customers pursuant to 
the facts and conditions described above and 
is further expressly conditioned on your 
representation that such transactions will be 
consummated by the customers of First Western 
with a reasonable expectation of economic 
gain. 
Id. at 563 (emphasis added) (1979 letter).  
 Thus, Arvey's opinion letters, like those in the above 
cited cases, expressly noted that Samuels and First Western, not 
Arvey, supplied the facts, that even under those facts there was 
no guarantee that the results predicted would be achieved, and 
that the letters should not be relied upon by the investors. 
                                                           
0The words which I have underscored read as follows in the 1980 
letter:  "with respect to his overall position."   
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Given all of this cautionary language, the plaintiffs should not 
have understood the opinion letters to mean that Arvey had made 
factual representations regarding First Western's programs.  I 
would therefore hold that the plaintiffs' could not have relied 
reasonably on the opinion letters as to the accuracy of the 
factual descriptions they contain, or indeed anything else, and 
thus no liability may be imposed on Arvey.      
 I have demonstrated already that the plaintiffs' 
reliance on the opinion letters was unreasonable.  But there is 
even more evidence to support this conclusion, as the 1980 letter 
also includes a veritable bugle blast of an announcement 
cautioning investors not to rely on Arvey's opinion:  
 [h]owever, as discussed in more detail 
below, the deductibility of any particular 
customer's losses may depend upon certain 
facts and circumstances related to such 
customer's account with First Western at the 
time the loss is incurred.  Accordingly, it 
is impossible for us to express an opinion as 
to the deductibility of any particular loss 
incurred by a customer of First Western.   
 
Id. at 586 (emphasis added).  In view of the foregoing statement, 
the plaintiffs' reliance on Arvey's letters was not simply 
unreasonable.  It was reckless.  I believe that it is absolutely 
clear that the plaintiffs could not have relied reasonably on an 
opinion letter to justify tax deductions when the letter 
indicates that  "it is impossible for us to express an opinion as 
to the deductibility of any particular loss incurred by a 
customer of First Western." 
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 An examination of the factors which we said in Straub 
should be considered when determining whether a plaintiff 
justifiably relied on the defendant's misrepresentations 
reinforces my conclusion, though I hasten to add that it is so 
obvious that the plaintiffs' reliance on Arvey's letters was 
unreasonable that I could stop my dissent at this point.  540 
F.2d at 598.  But I will go on.  There are five Straub factors: 
(1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship; (2) the 
plaintiffs' opportunity to detect the fraud; (3) the 
sophistication of the plaintiffs; (4) the existence of a long-
standing business or personal relationship; and (5) access to the 
relevant information.  Id.   In regard to the first and fourth 
factors, Arvey clearly had no special relationship with the 
plaintiffs that would give the plaintiffs any grounds to trust 
Arvey's representations or that would impose on Arvey any duty to 
inform the plaintiffs of possible inaccuracies.  Indeed, the 
majority acknowledges this point.  See typescript at 20.   
 As to the other factors, we must remember that we are 
not dealing with plaintiffs who made conventional investments. 
Straddle transactions are not designed for the proverbial "person 
on the street."  To the contrary, the transactions discussed in 
the opinion letters involved very complex financial arrangements 
meant for sophisticated investors looking for tax advantages. The 
mere fact that these transactions were on the cutting edge of 
strategic tax planning should have put any reasonable investor on 
notice that there was a substantial risk of tax complications. 
Furthermore, the various disclosures in the letters should have 
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provided the plaintiffs with the incentive and opportunity to 
detect possible fraud.  As I explain above, the letters not only 
made it clear that they were predicated on facts provided by 
Samuels, and not verified by Arvey, but they also disclosed past 
instances in which the IRS questioned the validity of 
transactions identical to those discussed in the letters, and 
indicated that it was likely there would be future trouble as 
well.  Thus, the letters gave the plaintiffs every incentive to 
make further inquiries into the legitimacy of the First Western 
program and should have caused them to withhold their investments 
until they had the information necessary to make informed 
decisions.  In sum, the application of the Straub factors 
dictates the conclusion that an investor could not justifiably 
rely on the representations contained in Arvey's opinion letters. 
 In rejecting this conclusion, the majority writes that 
there is no evidence that these plaintiffs had any particular 
knowledge or sophistication which would enable them to notice any 
irregularities in First Western's programs.  Id. at 20.  The 
majority notes further that reliance on the letters might be 
justified because an investor could take the letters to an 
attorney and, predicated on the facts in them, obtain an 
erroneous opinion.  Id. at 20-21. 
 But the opinion letters made it clear that the facts 
they contained originated from First Western, not Arvey. Although 
another attorney might have agreed with the legal analysis in the 
opinion letters, there is no way that another attorney could have 
confirmed from the letters themselves that the facts underlying 
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the opinions were correct as they were solely within the 
knowledge of First Western.  Any reasonable person reading the 
letters would have realized this and questioned the reliability 
of the factual descriptions of First Western's trading practices 
and, in particular, the statements regarding the independent 
economic validity of the transactions. Furthermore, as I noted 
above, the 1980 opinion letter states that investors are not to 
make an investment decision based on the letter, but if they do, 
they should at least obtain written permission from Arvey.  This 
admonishment should have pounded home to the plaintiffs the risk 
that they were taking. 
 I emphasize that it is critically important to focus on 
the precise nature of the plaintiffs' claims, because the 
reasonableness of the plaintiffs' reliance cannot be considered 
in the abstract.  The precise issue is whether the plaintiffs 
could rely reasonably on the letters in considering the tax 
consequences of canceling a forward contract.  As the plaintiffs 
explain in their opening brief at 5, "[t]he focus of each opinion 
letter was the federal income tax treatment of a loss sustained 
by a First Western customer upon the cancellation of a losing 
forward contract (a 'loss contract') prior to the contract's 
settlement date."  In particular, the plaintiffs claim that Arvey 
mislead them because its opinion letters said that they would 
have ordinary losses when canceling losing forward contracts.0 
                                                           
0Actually, it never has been established that this advice was 
wrong.  While the Tax Court ruled against other investors in the 
First Western program, and its decisions were affirmed on the 
merits by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the 
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 In the face of this claim, I ask the rhetorical 
question:  how can an investor reasonably rely on opinion letters 
to anticipate favorable tax treatment when they:  (1) are 
addressed to someone else; (2) are by their terms only for the 
use of someone else; (3) by their terms cannot be shown to the 
investor; (4) are predicated on facts not supplied by the author 
of the letters; (5) warn that the IRS likely will challenge the 
claim for favorable treatment as it has in similar situations; 
(6) explain the basis for the challenge; (7) state that the 
courts might take a strong stance contrary to the opinion; and 
(8) flatly announce that it is "impossible" for the author of the 
letter "to express an opinion as to the deductibility of any 
particular loss incurred by" an investor?  The answer is obvious. 
The investors could not rely reasonably on such letters, and thus 
Arvey is entitled to summary judgment on the Section 10(b) 
claims.0  In my view, nothing could be clearer. 
 Surely if there ever was any doubt as to Arvey's right 
to a summary judgment, it did not survive our recent opinion in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
plaintiffs were not parties to that case.  For all that we know, 
it is possible that if the plaintiffs had not chosen to settle 
with the IRS, they might have prevailed in litigation in either 
the Tax Court or in a different court of appeals.  Courts of 
appeals, after all, do not always view identical tax issues 
similarly.  See Pleasant Summit Land Corp. v. Comm'r., 863 F.2d 
263, 265 n.2. (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901, 110 
S.Ct. 260 (1989).  I acknowledge, however, that probably the 
plaintiffs would have lost and I further recognize that the 
Freytag case was a "test case."  Freytag, 904 F.2d at 1014.  Of 
course, my opinion is not dependent on whether Arvey's opinion 
was right or wrong. 
0Of course, there is no dispute of fact precluding summary 
judgment, as the plaintiffs do not contend that the opinion 
letters do not contain the provisions I have quoted. 
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In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357.  In Trump, 
as in this case, the plaintiffs asserted a Section 10(b) action.0  
The action arose from the sale of bonds by the defendants to 
acquire, complete the construction of, and open a gigantic casino 
in Atlantic City, New Jersey.  The plaintiffs were purchasers of 
the bonds who claimed that in making their purchases they relied 
on false statements in the prospectus.  The plaintiffs also 
asserted that material matters were omitted from the prospectus.  
The defendants successfully moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 12(b)(6), as the complaint failed to state a claim on which 
relief could be granted. 
 On appeal we affirmed on the basis of the "bespeaks 
caution" doctrine.  We pointed out that the prospectus was so 
filled with cautionary language that the allegedly misleading 
statements became immaterial as a matter of law.  Trump, 7 F.3d 
at 371-73.  I will not set forth the representations and 
cautionary language in Trump, for I see no need to do so. Rather, 
I indicate only that it seems obvious that the facts in Trump 
gave the investors a stronger claim for recovery than the facts 
in this case give the plaintiffs here.  Yet in Trump we affirmed 
the order of the district court granting the defendants judgment 
under Rule 12(b)(6). 
 I acknowledge that in Trump we held that the cautionary 
language rendered the alleged misrepresentation immaterial as a 
matter of law while here we are concerned with whether the 
                                                           
0Trump also involved other counts which we need not describe. 
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plaintiffs reasonably relied on Arvey's opinion letters.  But 
this distinction makes no difference.  The point is that the 
cautionary language in the Trump prospectus should have hammered 
home to the investors the risk they were taking.  Precisely the 
same thing is true here.  The plaintiffs here could not rely 
reasonably on documents which by their terms were not for their 
view and which were conditioned so thoroughly.  While it is true, 
as the majority points out, that Arvey may have known that 
investors would see the letters, that knowledge is immaterial to 
the question of reasonable reliance, a determination that must be 
predicated on what should be the investor's state of mind.  Thus, 
I do not urge that we hold that Arvey did not misrepresent.0 
Rather, I would hold Arvey has demonstrated that the plaintiffs 
unreasonably relied on its opinion letters. 
 By its holding that there is a triable issue as to 
whether the plaintiffs' reliance on the Arvey letters was 
reasonable, the majority effectively holds that no matter how 
thoroughly a law firm conditions its opinion, it may be liable to 
the investors in a Section 10(b) action for misrepresentation and 
omissions.  In this circuit there now will be no safe harbor for 
attorneys in the sea of Section 10(b) cases.  The majority's 
holding thus cannot be reconciled with the warnings, recently 
made by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, that where, 
as here, a law firm has "unequivocally informed potential 
                                                           
0Of course, on the basis of Trump and the other opinions I have 
cited, we could hold that there were no misrepresentations, but 
even if there were, they were not material.  But I am not taking 
that approach. 
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investors that the law firm had not verified the financial data 
provided to it by the client[,] . . . [t]o find a duty in the 
face of this express disclaimer of verification would render law 
firms powerless to define the scope of their involvement in 
commercial transactions."   See Fortson v. Winstead, McGuire, 
Sechrest, & Minick, 961 F.2d 469, 475 (4th Cir. 1992).  I cannot 
conceive of more explicit disclaimers than Arvey's.  If such 
disclaimers cannot permit a law firm to foreclose the possibility 
of imposition of liability on it to outside parties for issuing a 
written opinion to a client, then nothing will.  The result of 
the majority's position is therefore "a rigid rule charging all 
attorneys who involve themselves in any narrow corner of a 
commercial transaction with responsibility for the whole 
transaction" even when they expressly disclaim any such 
involvement.  Id.   
 Furthermore, as a practical matter, the majority 
opinion has eliminated the justifiable reliance element of 
Section 10(b) actions which hereafter in this circuit will exist 
only in theory.  The opinion will have far-reaching consequences 
in this circuit and perhaps beyond because in our national 
economy attorneys anywhere may recognize that in some securities 
transactions litigation in this circuit may materialize.  The 
opinion should lead knowledgeable commercial attorneys in 
situations in which the Securities Exchange Act may become 
implicated to be reluctant to advise anyone about anything which 
could affect the rights of investors or the value of the 
securities.  Indeed, I see no principled way to limit the 
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majority's decision to opinions given by attorneys.  Accordingly, 
I dissent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
